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By manipulating the number of citizens summoned, qualified, or sent questionnaires
on each of several multiple lists, a court can ensure racial and ethnic diversity on
venires. However the legality of this procedure remains unclear
by Nancy J. King and G. Thomas Munsterman
A s of 1990, one of every four
Americans claimed Afri-
can, Asian, Latino, or Na-
tive American ancestry.
Only 30 years earlier, approximately 90
percent of Americans were white, and
most of the remaining 10 percent were
African American.' In most court-
rooms around the country the compo-
sition of juries has not kept pace with
this rapid change in demographics,
1. See Ramirez, Multicultural Empowerment: it's
Not Just Black and White Anymore, 47 STAN. L. REv.
957, 991-1 (1995). The projections for 1995 in-
clude even lower percentages of "non-Hispanic"
whites. U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Statistical Abstract
of the United States 13, Table 12 (1994).
despite efforts by courts and lawmak-
ers to eliminate discriminatory selec-
tion procedures.
Of the various selection methods
that contribute to the underrepresen-
tation of members of racial and ethnic
minority groups on juries, peremptory
challenges have attracted the most at-
tention in recent years. Yet gains in di-
versity from regulating, or even elimi-
nating, peremptory challenges are
necessarily limited by the composition
of the venire from which jurors are
chosen. This article describes methods
of constructing lists of veniremembers
and qualified jurors used by some
courts to restore the racial and ethnic
diversity that is missing from the pri-
mary source lists or is eroded in the
process of summoning and qualifica-
tion. It also evaluates potential legal
challenges to these techniques.
NANCY J. KING is a professor of law at
Vanderbilt University.
G. THOMAS MUNSTERMAN is director of
the Center for Jury Studies, National Cen-
ter for State Courts.
Inability to secure racial and ethnic
diversity on lists of qualified jurors re-
mains the most intractable problem in
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jury administration today. Legal chal-
lenges to the composition of lists of
qualified jurors and veniremembers
continue to cause what one prosecutor
termed a "huge strain" on the courts.
A list of qualified jurors can take
months to compile and usually serves a
court as the sole source of grand jurors
and trial jurors for a year, or even sev-
eral years. A single defendant's attack
on the composition of a qualified list
may therefore require the
reprosecution of other defen-
dants indicted or convicted by
juries drawn from the same
tainted list, and delay further
jury proceedings while a new
list is created.
Even when selection systems
pass constitutional and statu-
tory standards, legally selected
venires that fail to reflect the
diversity of the community can
carry serious costs. The result-
ing underrepresentation of mi-
nority residents on juries means
that minority citizens receive
less exposure to the educa-
tional experience of jury ser-
vice, fuels the decline of public
trust in jury fairness, and raises
the risk that some jury decisions may
be mis- or under-informed, lacking the
breadth of experience that diverse
panels can provide.2
Hoping to minimize these risks,
state and federal judges and adminis-
trators have invested considerable re-
sources adjusting their selection pro-
cedures so that they are more likely to
produce panels that reflect the racial
and ethnic composition of the sur-
rounding community. Supplementing
or replacing voter lists with more in-
clusive lists, updating addresses, imple-
menting follow-up procedures for
those who do not respond to jury sum-
monses, reducing the economic hard-
ship ofjury service by increasing juror
compensation, providing child care,
and limiting the term of jury service
are steps that can help.3 These reforms,
however, often fall short of producing
qualified lists and venires that mirror
local demographics. Members of some
racial and ethnic minorities may be sta-
tistically less likely to receive their ques-
tionnaires and summonses because
they move more frequently,4 are more
likely to find it impossible to travel to
the courthouse due to distance or
cost,' and are more likely to be dis-
qualified for jury service because they
speak a language other than English,
are not United States citizens,6 or pos-
sess disqualifying criminal histories.7
Stratified selection
Stratified selection, also known as
structured or clustered sampling, is
one method of restoring to venires the
racial or ethnic diversity that is some-
times missing from original source lists
or that is reduced during the process
of qualification and summoning. By
manipulating the number of citizens
in each of several multiple smaller lists
who are summoned, qualified, or sent
questionnaires, a court can ensure
2. See, e.g., King, Racial Juiymandering: Cancer or
Cure? A Contemporay Review of Affirmative Action in
Juiy Selection, 68 N.Y.U L. REV. 707 (1993).
3. Munsterman and Munsterman, The Search for
Representativeness, I IJusT. Svs.J. 59 (1986).
4. See, e.g., SJCs Final Report On Racial and Ethnic
Bias, Massachusetts Lawyers Weekly, Oct. 3, 1994,
at 11 (reporting that state commission found that
underrepresentation on state juries is primarily
due to outdated address lists and the low response
rate of minority residents summoned for jury
duty.")
5. See, e.g., Hardin v. City of Gadsden, 837 F.
Supp. 1113, 1116 (N.D. Ala. 1993) ("given the ex-
tent of poverty and lack of vehicles among blacks in
the Northern District generally, the use of a dis-
trict-wide jury wheel disproportionately denies
them the opportunity to serve on juries outside
their divisions" noting that about one quarter of
black households had no access to a car, compared
to 6 percent of white households, and that al-
though the qualified wheel had almost 15 percent
blacks, the percentage of blacks that appeared in
venires was only 5-10 percent).
6. See, e.g., Lee, "Minority Issues injury Manage-
ment" 11 (September 1991) (noting that while
that each of several populations is
sampled proportionally, and can tar-
get for oversampling those popula-
tions that continue to yield dispropor-
tionately fewer veniremembers.
Potential jurors can be grouped ac-
cording to whatever demographic
characteristics are available to jury ad-
ministrators, including residence,
ethnicity, or race.
For example, assume that a master
list for a particular jury district is
composed of names of registered
voters from counties X, Y, and Z,
each containing equal numbers
of adult citizens. If the voter reg-
istration rate is lower in county X
than in counties Yand Z, and the
names of persons who will re-
ceive qualifying questionnaires
are selected randomly from a
combined list, the proportion of
questionnaires that are sent to
county X will be smaller than
that county's share of the entire
district's adult population. A
court can ensure that the propor-
tion of questionnaires sent to
each county always equals that
county's share of the district's
adult population by dividing the
district's jury list into counties and se-
lecting the county's proportionate
share of questionnaire recipients ran-
domly from each separate list.'
When racial or ethnic groups are
distributed unevenly among the coun-
ties, ensuring residential proportional-
ity at each step or in every mailing can
help ensure racial or ethnic propor-
only 3 percent of white residents of New Jersey in
1980 were non-citizens, 50 percent of Asian-Pacific
Islanders were non-citizens, as well as 23 percent of
those listed by the 1980 census as "Spanish Ori-
gin") (manuscript available from the Center for
Jury Studies of the National Center for State
Courts).
7. Id. at 13 (noting study finding that almost one
in four black men in their twenties is either serving
time or on probation or parole on any given day
compared to 15 percent for white males and 10
percent for Hispanic males).
8. Cf. Cerrone v. Colorado, 1995 Colo. LEXIS
300, affirming 867 P.2d 143 (Colo. App. 1994) (de-
scribing state grand jury selected by mailing 75
qualifying questionnaires to each of five counties);
United States v. McKinney, 53 F.3d 664 (5th Cir.
1995) (describing plan that requires question-
naires be sent to a randomly selected number of
names "weighted by county population"); Hardin,
837 F. Supp. at 1117 (noting that the names of per-
sons sent questionnaires when filling the district's
qualified jury wheel are selected by computer to
"include persons from each county within the dis-
trict proportionate to the percentage of voters
from those counties in the masterjury wheel").
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tionality as well. In the example above,
if county X contained a higher per-
centage of Latino residents than the
other counties, stratifying the ques-
tionnaire mailing by county will en-
sure that the share of questionnaires
sent to persons from county X never
falls below X's share of the entire
district's population.
Obviously, this example of stratified
selection has a relatively modest
goal. It assures only that the
number of potential jurors in
each county sent questionnaires
corresponds to that county's
share of the district adult popu-
lation. It does not guarantee that
residents will receive or return
those questionnaires, meet the
qualifications for jury service, or
be summoned for service in pro-
portion to the county's share of
the district's population. Seek-
ing more effective controls,
some jurisdictions have adopted
or considered more ambitious
stratification plans.
One alternative is to amend
jury selection procedures so that
additional qualification ques-
tionnaires and summons are sent to
persons in certain counties, districts,
or zip codes based on response rates to
prior mailings. Studies have shown, for
instance, that questionnaires sent into
some zip codes in New York that con-
tain predominantly minority residents
are completed and returned at a lower
rate than questionnaires sent to zip
codes containing proportionately
fewer minority residents.9 Such varia-
tions in response rates could form the
basis for the determination of the
number of extra names to be drawn
from specific sub-jurisdiction areas.
Some stratified systems, such as
9. THEJURY PROJECT, REPORT TO THE CHIEFJUDGE OF
THE STATE OF NEW YORK, March 31, 1994, at 15-17
(finding that the proportion of questionnaires des-
ignated by the post office as "non-deliverable" is
often higher for areas that contain predominantly
minority residents than it is for less diverse areas).
10. Allocation proved imprecise and subject to
challenge. All three systems were eventually re-
placed by county-wide random selection.
11. Another difference is that federal law re-
quires only that the master list mirror the geo-
graphic proportions of actual or registered voters, not
all adult residents. The proportion of minorities
that vote or register is well below the proportion of
whites that vote in most jurisdictions. For a de-
tailed description, see United States v. Bailey, 862
F. Supp. 277 (D. Colo. 1994).
those previously used in Maryland and
Delaware, were designed to follow re-
quirements allocating seats on the
grandjury proportionately by political
subdivision. The courts in Wayne
County, Michigan once composed
venires using units called "jurats,"
each of which consisted of a specific
number of names from each district
within the county."
Engineering jury lists to mirror
residential demographics is not a
particularly novel idea. Residential
proportionality on the master lists
from which qualified jurors are se-
lected has been required by statute
in every federal court since 1968 and
is also mandated in several states.
What is unique about the stratified
selection systems discussed above is
that they seek proportional represen-
tation by geography at later stages of
the jury selection process, not just on
original source lists or master wheels.
Another departure is the focus on
the representation of residential ar-
12. This has been the practice in some jurisdic-
tions in California and New York. See The Jury
Project, supra n. 9, at 18 (noting that one New York
jury commissioner has for several years sent more
questionnaires into minority neighborhoods "to
compensate for the relatively low numbers of mi-
nority jurors she sees.")
13. United States District Court for the District
of Connecticut, "Modification to the Second Re-
stated Plan for Random Selection of Grand and
PetitJurors Pursuant Tojury Selection And Service
Act of 1968 (As Amended)."
14. Georgia Uniform Superior Court Rule 34
(1980); Administrative Office of the Courts, Judi-
cial Council of Georgia, Jury Commissioner's
Handbook 19-22 (1992) (explaining Unified App.
Rule 34.3)).
eas that are quite small-such as zip
codes, census tracts, or local city
council or alderman precincts-as
compared to the larger units typi-
cally represented in master lists, such
as counties or municipalities."
Another stratified selection method
is the direct use of race or ethnicity to
target or define groups of potential ju-
rors to sample. Instead of preserving
geographic proportionality on
qualified lists or venires, and in
the process restoring racial pro-
portionality, these systems seek
race or ethnic proportionality
directly. For example, in an at-
tempt to improve the represen-
tativeness of venires, some
courts have instituted "infor-
mal" procedures whereby areas
of known minority populations
receive more questionnaires. 2
An ethnic-conscious plan was
recently adopted in the U.S. Dis-
trict Court for the District of
Connecticut, a court that has
weathered recent successful
challenges based upon the
underrepresentation of Hispan-
ics in its qualified lists and
venires.Judges there modified the jury
selection plan to provide that "addi-
tional" questionnaires, the number to
be based on the rate of response,
would be sent to "those munic-
ipalities... whose Hispanic population
is equal to or greater than ten percent
of its total population." The change
was adopted "to further enhance the
policy of the Jury Selection Plan.. .with
respect to the participation of Hispan-
ics in federal juries.""
In the Eastern District of Michigan a
system of post-qualification balancing
is used. The court there randomly
strikes from the list of persons quali-
fied the specific number of "white and
other" potential jurors needed to ob-
tain a qualified list with racial demo-
graphics identical to that of the popu-
lation. Jury commissioners in Georgia,
under supreme court guidance, must
"balance the box" of the names of
qualified jurors to correspond to the
race and gender proportions of the
county.14 Names of persons to be sum-
moned are selected from this balanced
box or list. Other courts have ap-
proved supplemental summonses of
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Jurisdictions considering these and
other stratified selection techniques
should be sure to research the causes
of underrepresentation with careful
statistical analysis. This can help re-
formers identify those specific stages
of the selection process that have
the most disproportionate ef-
fects, and can sometimes un-
cover problems in a selection sys-
tem that, when fixed, go a long
way to achieving proportionate
representation. One federal
court, for example, discovered
that its computer passed over for
selection any resident of a city
ending in the letter "d" because
it was programmed to conclude
that the "d" meant that the juror
had died. Another county court
learned that its system had been
pulling most of the potential ju-
rors from the biggest city into
one particular court of limited
jurisdiction, leaving very few ur-
ban minority residents for gen-
eral jurisdiction courts.
Statistical analysis can also minimize
the risk that proposed modifications
will produce unexpected results. For
instance, efforts to send extra ques-
tionnaires into a particular community
that contains more minority citizens
than other communities in the jury
district may backfire, skewing the ra-
cial composition of a qualified list even
further, if the number of additional
minority responders is dwarfed by the
increased numbers of white respond-
ers from the oversampled district.
Court computer systems may also re-
quire some updating to accommodate
the manipulation of combined lists or
a list with multiple variables, although
the most popular software systems now
in place for jury selection can handle
stratified selection.
The most frequent concern voiced
about stratified selection, however, is
not how to get it to work well, but
whether it is legal. Without the assur-
ance that proposed modifications
comply with the law, a court that
adopts stratified selection to combat
underrepresentation in its existing sys-
tem may risk trading one set of costly
legal challenges for another. So far
very few published judicial opinions
have considered whether any of these
various forms of stratified selection
comply with federal or state law.
Equal protection challenges
One potential challenge to stratified
selection is based on the equal protec-
tion rights of potential jurors under
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments
of the Constitution. When a jurisdic-
tion uses stratified selection to create
its qualified lists and venires, citizens
may be summoned at different rates,
depending on their residence, race,
ethnicity, or other criteria employed by
the selection system. Summoning a
person slightly more often based only
upon where he or she lives would prob-
ably pass equal protection review be-
cause of the legitimate governmental
interest in securing a cross-section of
the community on jury venires. How-
ever, the constitutionality of balancing
15. See, e.g. St. Cloud v. Leapley, 521 N.W.2d 118
(S.D. 1994) (reminding trial judges to add supple-
mental names of minorities to venire to correct
grossly underrepresentative venires).
16. A decision of the Supreme Court this past
term limiting the standing of those seeking to chal-
lenge race-conscious electoral districting practices
may curtail the pool of plaintiffs who could raise
this claim. In United States v. Hayes, 115 S. Ct.
2431 (1995), the Court concluded that only those
persons who reside within a racially-gerrymandered
district have suffered an injury sufficient to main-
tain an equal protection challenge to the use of
race in selecting the district's boundaries. Hays
suggests that only those citizens eligible for jury
lists by race or ethnicity, sometimes
termed affirmative action injury selec-
tion, has recently become the subject
of considerable academic debate.
It is not at all clear who would be al-
lowed to challenge the constitutional-
ity of a selection system that considers
race or ethnicity in constructing lists of
qualified jurors lists or veniremem-
bers. Potential jurors who may be sum-
moned less frequently because
of the system's use of race or
ethnicity may claim that they
have been denied equal oppor-
tunity to serve as jurors. 16 How-
ever, few who escape jury ser-
vice have an incentive to sue.
The more likely challenger of a
jury selection system is the
criminal defendant who seeks
relief from a jury's indictment
or guilty verdict.
Recent decisions of the Su-
preme Court provide two plau-
sible, but so far untested, theo-
ries by which a defendant could
seek relief from the decisions of
juries chosen from venires con-
structed with racially stratified
jury lists. A defendant may al-
lege a violation of his or her
own right to equal protection, if he or
she shares the race of those whose op-
portunities for jury service are re-
duced under the stratified system. Al-
ternatively, a defendant could assert
third-party standing to raise the rights
of potential jurors, even if he or she
does not share their race or ethnicity.
The Court has allowed defendants to
challenge discrimination against po-
tential jurors during voir dire under
this theory, 7 but has not addressed the
propriety of allowing defendants to
challenge violations of the rights of po-
tential jurors that may occur earlier in
the selection process."5
service whose chances for inclusion on the quali-
fied list could have been affected by the stratified
system would have standing to bring a constitu-
tional challenge.
17. See Powers v. Ohio, 111 S. Ct. 1364 (1991).
18. Some lower courts have. Compare State v.
Moore, 404 S.E. 2d 845, 846 (N.C. 1991) (granting
relief to African American defendant who objected
to replacement of white grand jury foreman with
African American grand jury foreman); and
Ramseur v. Beyer, 983 F.2d 1215, 1228 & n.8 (3d
Cir. 1992) (upholding judges attempt to secure ra-
cial balance on grand jury, but noting defendant
had standing to argue that thejudge's practice vio-
lated the rights of potential jurors), cert. denied, 113
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Even assuming that someone passed
over for service, or a defendant, has
standing to object to the consideration
of race or ethnicity in "balancing" ju-
ror lists, there is little agreement about
what standard of review a court should
use to evaluate the constitutionality of
such a scheme. Professor Albert
Alschuler has argued that because the
use of race to secure proportional
representation of minority racial
groups on juries does not stigma-
tize or disadvantage people on
the basis of their race, it should
withstand a challenge under the
Equal Protection Clause. 9 Others
have predicted that such tech-
niques would be upheld only if a
reviewing court was persuaded
that the use of race or ethnicity
was necessary to advance a com-
pelling governmental interest.2"
Two 1995 decisions of the U.S.
Supreme Court also suggest strict
scrutiny would be applied to race-
based selection procedures. In
Adarand Constructors, Inc., v. Pena,
addressing the constitutionality
of a minority preference for fed-
eral contracts, the Court empha-
sized that all race-based classifications
are presumptively invalid unless nar-
rowly tailored to achieve a compelling
interest.2 ' In Miller v. Johnson, the
Court revealed little interest in relax-
S. Ct. 2433 (1993) and Ranseur, 983 F.2d at 1251
(Cowen, J., dissenting) (finding defendant had
standing to raise and succeed on claim that grand
jurors' equal protection rights had been violated
by judge's effort to seat racially balanced grand
jury) with Ranseur, 983 F.2d at 1245 (Alito,J. con-
curring) (concluding that defendant had no stand-
ing to raise rights of grand jurors or potential
grand jurors). See also Meders v. State, 389 S.E.2d
320, 323 (Ga. 1990) (finding defendant failed to
preserve his challenge to Georgia's stratified sys-
tem, bnt expressing disapproval of "manipulat-
ing" the selection system); Meders, 389 S.E.2d at
326 (Bentham, J., concurring) (finding Georgia's
selection system constitutional); Acadiana Bureau,
Appeal court orders hearing on race issue, The Advo-
cate (Baton Rouge), March 9, 1995, at 3B (report-
ing case in which appellate court held white defen-
dant had standing to raise the rights of minority
residents excluded because of their race from ser-
vice as grand jury foremen).
19. See Alschuler, Racial Quotas and the Jury, 44
DuKF L.J. 704 (1995).
20. See, e.g., King, supra n. 2.
21. 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995).
22. Miller v. Johnson, 115 S. Ct. 2475 (1995).
Previously, in 1993, the Court agreed that voters
may bring a claim tinder the Equal Protection
Clause when the boundaries of their electoral dis-
trict were designed to enhance the proportion of
minority voters in the district. In Miller, the Court
explained that such a claim should succeed with
proof that "the legislature subordinated tradi-
tional race-neutral districting principles" to racial
ing this standard in the context of elec-
toral districts, where, as in the jury se-
lection context, federal law closely
regulating racial imbalance gives law-
makers an incentive to act affirma-
tively to secure racial balance.22
The Court also has yet to clarify
which interests could qualify as com-
pelling enough to justify the consider-
ation of race. In Adarand, the Court
cited as the only example of a compel-
ling interest the goal of correcting
"pervasive, systematic, and obstinate
discriminatory conduct, ' 23 suggesting
that ongoing, intentional discrimina-
considerations, unless the state can show that its
use of race is necessary to achieve a compelling
state interest. Id. at 2481.
23. 115 S. Ct. at 2117 (describing the problem
addressed by the race-based remedy that was up-
held in United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149
(1987)).
24. IndeedJustice O'Connor's majority opinion
in Adarand cited Justice Powell's pivotal opinion in
that case favorably. But see Hopwood v. Texas, 1996
U.S. App. LEXIS 4719 (March 18, 1996) rejecting
diversity as a compelling interest in law school ad-
missions, stating "Justice Powell's arguments in
Bakke garnered only his own vote and has never
represented the view of a majority of the Court").
25. See Adarand, 115 S.Ct. at 2118 (a racial classi-
fication cannot strvive strict scrutiny unless there
was first 'consideration of the use of race-neutral
means' to achieve the government's goal, quoting
Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 109 S. Ct. 706, 729
(1989)).
26. See, e.g., United States v. Gometz, 730 F. 2d
475 (7th Cir.) (en banc) (refusing "to infer from
the provision empowering court clerks to follow up
on non-responders a legislative intent that the
power must be used to eliminate possible non-
response bias" and quoting Senate Report No.
891, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 10, U.S. Code Cong. &
Admin. News 1968 p. 1792 (1967) ("The act... does
not require that at any stage beyond the initial
source list the selection process shall produce
groups that accurately mirror community make-
up.")), cert. denied 469 U.S. 845 (1984).
tion may now be the only situation in
which the justices would uphold a
race-conscious remedy. Such a strict
interpretation of the Equal Protection
Clause may prove fatal to stratified ju-
ror selection techniques that take race
or ethnicity into account. These tech-
niques are adopted not to remedy on-
going intentional discrimination in
the selection of jurors, but to restore
discrepancies between the de-
mographics ofjury lists and the
demographics of local adult
populations, imbalances pro-
duced by race-neutral selection
methods and criteria.
Absent a more conclusive
pronouncement, however, it is
also reasonable to predict that
the Court may in the future ac-
cept as "compelling" other, for-
ward-looking interests. For ex-
ample, the Court has not
overruled a 1977 decision up-
holding the use of race as a fac-
tor in medical school admis-
sions in order enhance the
academic and educational envi-
ronment.24 Methods of select-
ing potential jurors for quali-
fied lists and venires that use race or
ethnicity may survive constitutional at-
tack if the interest in promoting the le-
gitimacy of jury verdicts provides an
equally strong basis for upholding
race-based selection systems, and other
race-neutral options are not available
for achieving the same goals.
2 5
Statutory challenges
Federal courts considering stratified
systems should also anticipate chal-
lenges under the Jury Selection and
Service Act, 28 U.S.C. §§1861-1868.
This statute requires federal jurors to
be "selected at random from a fair
cross section of the community in the
district or division wherein the court
convenes" and prohibits "exclu[sion]
from service...on account of race,
color, religion, sex, national origin, or
economic status." Courts have agreed
that the federal jury selection statute
does not mandate stratified selection
methods that could prevent imbal-
ances in qualified wheels and venires,
26
but they have yet to address whether it
bars such remedies.
The text of the act offers little guid-
March-April 1996 Volume 79, Number 5 Judicature 277
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ance. On the one hand, the act no-
where defines what is meant by its
command that selection be "ran-
dom." Indeed, it gives discretion to
jury clerks to compel people to re-
spond to jury questionnaires when at
first they do not return them, allowing
for some manipulation of the qualified
list beyond whatever composition the
initial mailing produces."7 On the
other hand, it does not mention resi-
dential balancing when describing the
creation of lists of qualified
jurors or veniremembers,
nor does it mention racial
balancing for any list, even
though it expressly provides
that the master wheel re-
flect the residential demo-
graphics that appear in the
list of registered voters.
Stratifying jury lists, at
least by residence, does not
appear to violate the main
purpose of the Act, which
was not to require random-
ness in a statistical sense,
but only to prevent inten-
tional discrimination
against individuals or
groups. As one court ex-
plained, when a selection
technique "create [s] only a
slim chance that particular
jurors could be designated by the jury
clerk," it is sufficiently "random" un-
der the Act.28
In dicta 20 years ago, the Tenth Cir-
cuit declined to condemn a system
that "oversampled" certain areas con-
taining residents who tend to be dis-
qualified and excused at higher rates
than others, noting that "the practical
effect of the alleged initial 'overrepre-
sentation'...when considered in con-
junction with the disproportionate
number of 'travel hardship' excuse re-
quests from that division, was a 'quali-
fied' jury wheel more accurately re-
flecting a 'fair cross section of the
community' than would have been ob-
tained had every seventy-fifth name
from each division been selected.
'29
The act may erect even greater
hurdles for race- or ethnicity-based se-
lection systems. If the reduced rate at
which non-minority citizens are sum-
moned for jury service under racially
stratified systems can be considered
278 Judicature Volume 79, Number 5
"exclusion" from jury service, or if a
court concludes that any consider-
ation of race or ethnicity conflicts with
the anti-discrimination norm of the
act, a statutory challenge to a racially-
stratified system could succeed. Need-
less to say, both of the federal courts
that have specifically attended to racial
balance in their qualification proce-
dures-the Eastern District of Michi-
gan and the District of Connecticut-
consider their methods well within
those authorized by the act.
Because many state courts are bound
by state statutes that resemble the fed-
eral act, stratified selection in state sys-
tems may face similar arguments. State
courts interested in adopting stratified
selection techniques may choose to by-
pass or eliminate such statutory chal-
lenges by amending state law to accom-
modate stratified selection. This
legislative route has its own share of
hazards, of course. A statute that
27. 28 U.S.C. §1964(a). Follow up procedures
can have a significant effect on minority represen-
tation in venires. In Madison, Wisconsin, state
court follow-up letters to jurors who do not return
their questionnaires have raised the return rate
from African Americans from 31 to 42 percent, al-
though the rate for whites is nearly double that at
83 percent. Schneider, New Rules to Expand Jury
Picks, Capital Times (Madison), Nov. 15, 1994, at
IA.
28. United States v. Bearden, 659 F.2d 590, 603
(5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied 456 U.S. 936 (1982). See
also United States v. Eyster, 948 F.2d 1196, 1213
(11th Cir. 1991), cert. denied 502 U.S. 1099 (1992).
29. United States v. Test, 550 F.2d 577, 584 n.4
(10th Cir. 1976).
30. SeeJURORs: TrE POWER OF TWEi.vE, REPORT OF
overtly recognizes race or ethnicity as a
factor in jury selection may offend
those legislators or constituents who
would prefer to adhere to a color-blind
selection system.
As vicinage-wide reforms continue
to fail to yield demographically repre-
sentative venires, judges, lawmakers,
and administrators are searching for
other solutions that will. Striking par-
ticularly unrepresentative
venires ("venire shop-
ping") or calling in huge
numbers of jurors for iso-
lated racially-sensitive
cases, 30 are responses that
may appease particular liti-
gants, but may in the long
run prove to be arbitrary
and expensive to adminis-




residential, racial, or eth-
nic representation in most
or all venires, not just in
isolated cases. However, ju-
risdictions considering
stratified selection meth-
ods should tread carefully,
as the rulings of courts on
this delicate and complex topic are dif-
ficult to predict. V1
THE ARIZONA SUPREME COURT CoMMrrrEE ON MORE Er-
FECTIVE USE OF JURIES 44-45 (Sept. 1994) (recom-
mending that judges make more use of their power
to strike grossly underrepresentative jury panels);
Ackerman, Second jury picked for homicide trial; First
juy dismissed because pool failed to include blacks, Pitts-
burgh Post-Gazette, Jan. 11, 1995, at BI; Youth
Guilty in the Killing of 2 Gay Men, N.Y. Times, Feb 10,
1995, at A25 (reporting that defendant's first trial
was canceled because the 70-member jury pool
lacked enough black members); Torrance, Jury
makeup among issues raised by Chapel defense; Small
percentage of adults listed in county's pool, Atlanta J.
and Const., Aug. 4, 1995, at 
3
J (noting judge de-
nied motion for changed jury selection method
"but did allow them to call 400 prospective ju-
rors-double the number usually summoned").
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Syva's support for drug courts dates back to the
beginning of this innovative partnership of judges,
criminal justice, and treatment providers. On-site
urine testing, based on Emit® drugs-of-abuse
assays, is integral to their success in rehabilitating
defendants and streamlining the judicial process.
Emit assays have been validated in dozens
of court decisions, all the way up to the Supreme
Court. Their accuracy and reliability are docu-
mented in close to 200 published papers. Syva's
Substance Abuse Specialist team brings over
25 years of experience to help you design and
implement programs to meet your needs.
Emit and Syva Link are trademarks of Behning Diagnostics Inc.
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Succeed with Syva. For a free copy of the
special issue of the Syva Link on drug courts,
or for help in implementing or updating your
urine testing program, give us a call.
1-800-227-9948.
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